The moral status of harmless adult-child sex

Abstract: Nonforcible adult-child sex is thought to be morally wrong in part because it is nonconsensual. In this paper, I argue against this notion. In particular, I reject accounts of the moral wrongfulness of adult-child sex that rest on the absence of consent, concerns about adult exploitation of children, and the existence of a morally primitive duty against such sex.

Introduction: There are two standard reasons given in support of the notion that nonforcible adult-child sex is morally impermissible: it harms the participating children and it infringes upon the children's rights because it is nonconsensual. This issue is important since the empirical case for the harmfulness of voluntary adult-child sex has been called into doubt. If such nonforcible adult-child sex is not harmful, then the moral impermissibility of such sex (and the case for banning it) rests on another reason. In this paper, I argue for the following thesis: other things equal, pedophilia is wrong if and only if it is harmful or the child's parents do not agree to it. The "other things equal" clause is designed to screen out third-party concerns, e.g., it screens concerns relating to the promotion of an atmosphere conductive to child rape. If this is correct, then our best judgment as to the general permissibility of adult-child sex rests on the empirical analysis of its harmfulness (or lack thereof) and on concerns surrounding parental permission to it. If a reader views nonforcible adult-child sex as invariably harmful, then this paper can be seen as a theoretical investigation of whether there are additional reasons against such interactions.

source: Paper 'The moral status of harmless adult-child sex' by Stephen Kershnar; www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/40441288?uid=3738736&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21104824988127; Public Affairs Quarterly, Volume 15, Number 2; April 2001